I Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions
To say that Kant has a "theory" about the emotions would be a misstatement for at least two reasons. The first reason is terminological. As I will use the term in this paper, "emotions" is a general term for all the states designated by words such as affects, feelings, some inclinations and desires, passions, etc. Kant uses no single German word to play this role. It is true that he uses terms that are often translated as the English word "emotion:" Gefühl, Affekt,
and Rührung, for instance. But for Kant none of these words plays the same role -a shorthand term for the whole family of related concepts -that "emotion" will play in this paper. Take
Rührung as an example. Often rendered as "emotion" in English translations of Kant, 3 Rührung is only a subclass of what I am calling "emotions." Rührung requires a sort of mental movement -a shift or alternation between, say, an excess and deficiency of some internal force (K3 5:226).
Other less complex or more static feelings, such as simple liking or attraction, are not
Rührungen. By using a general term like "emotion" that Kant does not, I will avoid pre-empting any of his own terms.
A second reason it is wrong to say that Kant has a "theory" of emotions is that he never gives a general, overarching account of them in a single place. This is not to say that he is haphazard when he writes about emotions. On the contrary: Kant seems to be working from an impressively consistent taxonomy of desires, feelings, and the relations between them. He also has long lists of affects and passions and the distinctions among them. There is considerable evidence that Kant intends the words he uses for particular states or faculties related to emotions -inclinations (Neigungen), affects (Affekten), passions (Leidenschaften), desires (Begierden),
etc. -as technical terms. Rich, specific definitions and examples for these terms occur in the Anthropology, and Kant seems to use them consistently throughout his critical and post-critical career. I will not be claiming that all of this adds up to a full "theory" of emotions in the moral life. I would only claim that he has views about the emotions that are important to understanding his ethics -views that are often misunderstood. I want to begin by outlining these views.
It is important to understand why Kant is thought to limit the role of emotion at all. Many misunderstandings about Kant and the emotions arise from his use of the term "inclination" (Neigung). "Inclination" is Kant's technical term for "habitual sensible desire (habituelle sinnliche Begierde)" (A 7:251). 4 Human beings find themselves with all sorts of empirical or sensible desires -"empirical" in that these desires exist independently of any reasoning or reflection. Inclinations include desires for food and rest, the desire for self-preservation, and love and sympathy for others. Inclinations cover a broad spectrum of human desires, and clearly only some of these (such as love and sympathy) fall under the category of "emotions" (as I am using the term). Kant's opponents sometimes argue that since Kant assigns no special moral esteem to inclinations, he has no room for emotions such as love and sympathy. The important mistake in this accusation will soon become clear.
It is in fact the case that Kant assigns no special moral esteem to inclinations. Beginning even before the Groundwork, Kant consistently gives two reasons that "inclinations" are not a suitable foundation for morality. First, inclination cannot be a reliable criterion or "measuring rod" for morality, since one may be inclined to do what is not right. Second, inclination cannot be a reliable motivation or "mainspring" for morality, since there will certainly be occasions where one may not be inclined to do what is right. In both cases, note that it is inclination's unreliability that rules it out as a candidate ground for morality. Kant distinguishes these two issues as early as the Lectures in Ethics in 1780: "We must distinguish between measuring-rod and mainspring. The measuring-rod is the principle of discrimination, the mainspring is the principle of the performance of our obligation." 5 There is a third and fourth crucial reason that inclination has a questionable moral status.
These reasons are perhaps less obvious in the Groundwork, 6 but far more important than the first two in Kant's other writings. The third reason is this. For Kant, inclinations are not the products of an active, free will, but rather the products of deterministic nature that we possess passively without any activity of our own. As such, they are not suitable objects for moral esteem. Why attribute special esteem to inclinations when their possession is a mere matter of luck? Key for Kant here is the notion of freedom: only action according to certain principles that one's free will actively formulates and adopts may have "moral worth" (Kant's term for special esteem).
Actions have moral worth only insofar as they arise from the active agency of human agents, not as passive side effects of nature. 7 The fourth reason concerns the relation willing has to the moral law. One can take inclination as a reason for action in the absence of any antecedent commitment to morality; but actions have special esteem only insofar as they are connected to some antecedent commitment to morality. As Kant says in the third Critique, a characteristic of human morality is that "reason must exercise dominion over sensibility" (K3 5:269). The third and fourth reasons are in fact his deepest reasons for denying inclination a positive moral status.
These are four strong reasons against assigning inclination either a determining role or a special positive status in morality. But to deny inclination these moral roles is not to deny all emotions a moral role. To see why, we will need to understand Kant's taxonomy of these and other terms. It is to that taxonomy that I turn now. "Feeling" (Gefühl, Empfindung) is the capacity to be susceptible to pleasure and pain (MM 6:211). "Feeling" is also Kant's term for specific instances of this susceptibility to pleasure and pain -that is, for specific pleasures and pains, not just to the capacity to have them. 11 Susceptibility to sensible pleasure and pain, then, is a condition at the deepest root of human experience.
The faculty of "desire" is distinct from feeling, but related to it in an important way. In fact, the relation between feelings and desires allows us to distinguish two types of feeling: (1) those feelings not necessarily connected with desire and (2) those feelings necessarily connected with desire (see Figure 1 ).
Consider the first sort of feeling. For feelings not necessarily associated with desires, pleasure "attache[s] only to the representation by itself." Kant calls this pleasure "inactive delight," and the feeling associated with it "taste" (MM 6:212). Feelings of this sort are characteristic of the experience of the beautiful described in the third Critique. To experience something as beautiful is to represent it to oneself disinterestedly -that is, to find one's representation of an object agreeable without necessarily taking an interest in the existence of the object (K3 5:222). One can experience this sort of pleasure without trying to make some change in the physical world.
Now consider the second sort of feeling -the sort necessarily connected with desires. In this case, the pleasure attaches "to the existence of the object," not (or not just) to one's representation of it (MM 6:211). Kant calls this sort of pleasure "practical pleasure," since the desire associated with it aims at the existence of some object or state of affairs (MM 6:211) .
This is what Kant means when he describes the faculty of desire (Begehren, or
Begerungsvermögen) as "a being's faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations" (K2 5:10n, emphasis removed; MM 6:211, A 7:251). To desire something, then, is to represent it with a feeling of pleasure and to seek to bring it about. So far this framework of desires and feelings is only schematic, but one can already see that at least basic desires and feelings play an inescapable role in Kant's psychology of moral action: no moral willing or desiring will be possible without feeling of some kind. As
Kant says in the third Critique, "the attainment of an aim" -moral or otherwise -"is always connected with the feeling of pleasure" (K3 5:187).
Desire necessarily involves feelings, but desire is of two sorts, depending on whether the pleasure associated with it is the cause of the desire or instead its effect (K3 5:221-222; MM 6:212). Kant calls pleasure-caused desire "desire [Begierde] in the narrow sense" (MM 6:212).
In this case, an agent seeks to bring about the existence of some object or state of affairs because of some antecedent pleasure. When these desires are habitual, Kant gives them their own term:
inclinations.
In the case of the other sort of desire, pleasure is the effect of the desire. Here it is reason that causes the desire, which in turn results in pleasure. As early as the Groundwork, Kant recognizes the existence of at least one such reason-caused desire: he calls the feeling necessarily connected with it "respect" or "moral feeling." 12 "Though respect is a feeling," he says, "it is not one received by means of influence; it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept" (G 4:401n; see also K2 5:72-80). Kant's treatment of respect and moral feeling in the third Critique is consistent with the characterization of these emotions in the Groundwork and the second Critique. For instance, the third Critique indicates that "in the case where an underlying a priori principle in reason determines the will," the associated "pleasure (in moral feeling) is the consequence of that principle" (K3, 5:289). We have a "an ability for determining a priori with regard to mere forms of practical maxims (insofar as such maxims qualify themselves for giving universal law) a liking that we make a law for everyone; this judgment is not based on any interest, yet it gives rise to one" -namely, "moral feeling" (K3 5:300; the italics are Kant's). So the third Critique's treatment of reason-caused desire is consistent with Kant's treatment of it elsewhere.
The class of "pleasure-caused desires" -desires where an agent seeks to bring about some object or state of affairs based on some pre-existing pleasure -has a subclass for those pleasurecaused desires that are habitual. Kant's technical definition of inclination captures this:
inclination (Neigung) is "habitual sensible desire" (A 7:251; MM 6:212). As we saw above, inclinations are not only unreliable as a motivation ("mainspring") and standard ("measuring rod") for morality, but more importantly, actions based on them are not necessarily the result of an agent's free willing in connection with the moral law. The habituality of the desires that are inclinations seems to be especially worrisome to Kant: when an agent habitually acts on the same pleasure-caused desire, we may say of her that she has a sort of rule or principle of action (a "maxim" -G 4:399-400) by which she acts. Kant elsewhere describes an inclination as "a sensible desire (sinnliche Begierde) that serves the subject as a rule (habit)" (A 7:265). 13 This rule or habit may be neither actively chosen nor connected to a commitment to morality, and this is precisely why acts based on it are not worthy of special esteem or moral worth, even if these acts are in accordance with the moral law: agents with inclination-based maxims are simply in the habit of following antecedent pleasures. By contrast, agents whose maxims are based on active, freely willed respect for the moral law are worthy of esteem.
14 The third Critique is the first place where Kant makes two new claims about the role of emotions in morality. We saw above that susceptibility to feelings of pleasure and pain was a condition of experience. But Kant makes a stronger, more specific claim in the third Critique:
susceptibility or "the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e. to moral feeling" is a condition of morality, not just a condition of experience (K3 5:265). Just as there is no experience without the capacity for pleasure and pain, there is no morality without the capacity for the specific feeling of respect or moral feeling. As Kant will say later, it is a misunderstanding to think anyone could have a duty to acquire these sort of feelings, since they are "subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty" (MM 6:399).
The second new claim about the emotions in the third Critique is this: "respect" or "moral We have been examining a subclass of "desires." But Kant also believes there are subclasses of feelings that are not necessarily connected to desires. One such broad subclass -a subclass Kant emphasizes in the third Critique -includes Rührungen (which I will translate as "stirrings"). 15 Stirrings are constituted by a movement from or alternation between one feeling and its opposite. This makes them more complex than, for example, aesthetic feelings, which require no such movement between opposites (K3 Two points about the notion of reason-caused affects are in order. First, "moral feeling"
or "respect" seems to be the only sort of emotion that we can know about a priori (K2 What is the moral status of enthusiasm? The answer is somewhat complex.
Enthusiasmus is a natural outgrowth (and an indication of success) of free, active moral willing.
At the same time, Kant thinks that affects can be dangerous to freedom -so much so that "we for an agent to do his or her duty. If "enthusiasm" is a common, possibly worrisome natural byproduct of practical reason, "fortitude" is an affect that is necessary for the performance of some moral duties. This is a striking position given the image of Kant many readers take from the Groundwork and the second Critique. Perhaps all affects do "momentary damage to freedom and self-mastery" (A 7:267); the interesting point is that for Kant, it can be one's moral duty to briefly damage this very freedom and self-mastery. It is indeed a mistake to worry that depriving this presentation [that is, the presentation of the moral law] of whatever could commend it to the senses will result in its carrying with it no more than a cold and lifeless approval without any moving force or emotion [Rührung] . It is exactly the other way round. For once the senses no longer see anything before them, while yet the unmistakable and indelible idea of morality remains, one would sooner need to temper the momentum of an unbounded imagination so as to keep it from rising to the level of enthusiasm [Enthusiasm] , than to seek to support these ideas with images and childish devices for fear that they would otherwise be powerless. (K3 5:274)
III Reason-Caused Affects in the Third
Note that enthusiasm is an affect that naturally tends to arise from reasoning about morality.
This shows that Kant said the same things in 1790 about enthusiasm that he said in 1798. But more broadly, the passage also helps debunk the stereotype of Kant as a proponent of a detached, emotionless morality. For Kant, the agent who engages in moral reason is more likely to have trouble with an excess of emotional motivation than a deficiency.
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"Astonishment" or "admiration" [Bewunderung], a second reason-produced affect from the Anthropology, also appears in the third Critique. 21 There is a certain "aesthetic sublimity" to reason-caused enthusiasm, Kant says; but someone who is without affects is aesthetically sublime "in a far superior way." Such a state of mind -a state without affects -can somewhat paradoxically arouse an affect: "admiration [Bewunderung]," "an amazement that does not cease once the novelty is gone" (K3 5:272). In other words, reason can produce an affect in attending to the absence of affect. In the Anthropology, Bewunderung is the "holy thrill at seeing the abyss of the supersensible opening at our feet" (A 7:261); here, the holy thrill has a more specific object: the supersensible that opens to us is our own power to be without reason-impeding affects. Kant thinks that an awareness of this power to not be at the whim of empirical desire is essential to morality; and since the (reason-caused) emotion of astonishment provides this awareness, it is clear that emotions play a positive role in Kant's ethics.
The experience of the sublime, developed at some length in the third Critique, plays a role that parallels the more specific affect Bewunderung. The experience of the sublime begins with an encounter with either absolute magnitude or with absolute power. The notion of infinity in mathematics is an example of absolute magnitude: numbers march on forever one by one, yet we seem to be able to wrap our arms around the notion of infinity as a totality. Forces of nature such as "hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty river" (K3 5:261) are examples of absolute power: these forces threaten to destroy the agent, yet if she stands in a safe place, she discovers in herself an ability even greater than these natural forces -they cannot dominate her so as to force her to surrender her highest principles (K3 5:262). This experience of the sublime "reveals in us at the same time an ability to judge ourselves independent of nature, and reveals in us a superiority over nature that is the basis of a self-preservation quite different in kind from the one that can be assailed and endangered by nature outside us" (K3 5:261). Through either of these experiences, the agent notices in herself the existence of an "unlimited ability," something independent of nature (K3 5:259). This discovery is not immediately pleasurable. In the case of absolute magnitude, the agent feels frustration at the inability of her imagination to comprehend numerical infinity; in the case of absolute power, she feels the fear of imminent destruction by the forces of nature. Yet in both cases, this displeasure alternates with pleasure, since the discovery of the unlimited ability within herself is a pleasurable experience. This is a "pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure" (K3 5:260). Kant calls this alternation between displeasure and pleasure an "agitation" and a "vibration" (K3 5:260); the net effect he calls a "negative pleasure" (K3 5:245).
These descriptions of the feelings associated with the sublime place it clearly in the class of emotions called "stirrings" [Rührungen] above. 22 Defenders of the importance of the emotions argue that emotions are morally informative:
emotions alert us to morally salient features about specific circumstances and objects of intrinsic value in those circumstances. 23 
